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“Axel in Wonderland” is Professor Leijonhufvud’s effort to make sense of the research that is 
currently undertaken in Europe’s (and elsewhere) leadings central banks as they cope with the 
worse financial crisis since the great depression. He finds their continued focus on Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models at least perplexing. In order to understand why this is 
the case we need to consider these developments in relation to his own background, and he himself 
makes a remark on this when discussing the history of the discipline. He writes:  
“It is often useful to think of the History of Economic Thought as a growing decision tree. We have 
arrived at the present state of the subject through decisions made by prior contributors who have 
persuaded the entire economics profession, or some especially influential segment of it, to take a 
particular sequence of forks in preference to what seemed the alternatives at the time. DSGE is a 
branch of the tree that prospered abundantly up until the crisis. Here we are posed with a choice 
between two of its outermost twigs. (I find myself perched on another branch altogether.)” (page 1-
2)  
The parenthesis reveals the author’s characteristic modesty, as he is not simply perched on another 
branch, but his work altogether forms another branch of this almost 250 year old oak. What is more, 
where one is ‘perched’ informs his/her perspective on the developments in DSGE modelling that 
consume so much energy and talent draining resources from the rest of the tree. 
The two twigs that Professor Leijonhufvud considers in some detail are modifications within the 
DSGE world that aim to make these models deal better with issues in the labour market, and 
especially deal with the problem of unemployment. These modifications are: 1) Labour market 
frictions. These frictions can be due to a host of issues that include labour unionisation, or 
information asymmetry, or problems with incentives, etc. 2) “Preference shocks that shift the 
marginal disutility of labor” (page 2). While I concede that (1) has been a broader and more widely 
studied avenue of research among the scholars working in this field, in the rest of this comment I will 
concentrate on (2) because I think it has interesting, and often ignored, ramifications for this 
broader research project. 
Let me start by providing some context. DSGE modelling is part of a broader program within 
economics that has tried, since the 1970s, to introduce robust microtheoretical foundations in 
macroeconomic models. Starting with the work of Robert Lucas the two pillars of this program2 have 
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 I am here taking a very broad view, as there are important and substantial technical, ideological and other 
differences between the Rational Expectations models of Lucas, the Real Business Cycles models following 
Kydland and Prescott and the later literature on New Keynesian modelling. But these two pillars are shared by 
all these programs and their substantial progeny.  
been that any macroeconomic behaviour of the economy must be directly linked to individual 
actions, and that individual behaviour follows the rationality axioms that are the bedrock of 
neoclassical microeconomic theory. Because of these two pillars the theoretical, even scientific, 
superiority of this research program was proclaimed over other programs that reputedly introduced 
ad hock assumptions that lacked ‘true’ theoretical basis when their models faced empirical 
difficulties. In this research programme the most widely used models assume that you have a typical 
individual, or a typical household, and that the world is a multiple of this household. This creates a 
direct link between individual (or household) action and macroeconomic behaviour. And since these 
individuals are rational and operate in a general equilibrium world, they always respond in a way 
that maximises their welfare, or, as economists call it, their utility. The problem that this individual 
continuously faces is unforeseen shocks, which make him/her alter their behaviour to cope with 
these changes that unavoidably alter their current and future plans. Thus, the world around these 
agents continually changes, and they have to change their rational decisions across a number of 
variables (consumption/saving, work/leisure, portfolio choices etc.) to take account of the new 
environment. These unforeseen events where, in the first generation Real Business Cycle models in 
the 1980s, technology shocks, but they later came to include other types of shocks, even 
government induced ones. Over the last 10 or so years, preference shocks have surfaced 
occasionally as possible modifications in this field’s efforts to overcome discrepancies between what 
the models predict and real data. 
Thus it is not surprising that preference shocks are again considered, this time in relation with labour 
market issues and unemployment. What I do find surprising is that researchers working in the DSGE 
mould find this avenue a possible way forward. That is they find this to be a modification upon which 
further growth on this field can take place. For the sake of argument let us assume that a DSGE 
model with a type of preference shock that relates to the labour-leisure decision of this neoclassical 
representative individual, produces simulated results for this economy that mimic, very closely, the 
real data that we have. Would this be a success for DSGE modelling? Or to put it in less loaded 
terms, what would this mean for the DSGE branch of economics? 
I think we are faced with an interesting conundrum. On one side we have come up with a model that 
does very well by the metrics of success that this research program uses, which is the comparison of 
simulated to real data. On the other side this apparent success comes with utilising a type of shock 
that at least appears to contradict one of the pillars of the broader research program. This is because 
preference shocks suggest that this representative individual is irrational, at least with respect to his 
labour decision, in that he takes unforeseen actions (unforeseen to himself) that violate his 
rationality and have no clear cognitive or other reason. He then uses all his –substantial- rational 
machinery to compensate for this unforeseen change in his environment, brought about entirely 
because he changed his mind on how much labor to provide. If indeed this is a good description of 
how individuals behave in reality, I wonder what the general message from this is. To claim that this 
is a step towards some type of behavioural economics, or bounded rationality, seems a bit of a 
stretch as we have no complex (or simple) clearly articulated explanation why this individual displays 
this (or any) type of irrationality. And in any case broader questions are unavoidable. For example, 
why is it that he is irrational in only this way, and only in his behaviour towards this particular 
choice? 
Taking a step back, and looking at these developments on this branch of economic modelling from 
the foliage of another branch, one may be able to frame even larger questions. One of them is: when 
has a research project run its course, reached an impasse that shows that this program needs to be 
abandoned for something else and perhaps radically different? A conventional answer to this 
question emanating from theories of knowledge or the literature on scientific progress, is that 
programmes fail either because they lose their contact with reality and the phenomena they try to 
explain, forecast or predict,3 or they reach a point of crisis as they find empirical or analytical results 
that contradict foundational aspects of the research project. 
It is this second criterion that is at the centre of our current puzzle. I, looking from outside, see this 
latest trend as a negation of the whole program, and if such modelling modifications become 
established we appear to have returned to the start of this research endeavour. Thus, to me at least, 
models with all kinds of preference shocks appear to be lacking microfoundations as much as earlier 
models, that, by the way, had other interesting characteristics- and Professor Leijonhufvud gives an 
indication of these in his article. Have we simply traded one black box for another? And then why 
bother with the sophisticated mathematical machinery of rational agents, if the most important 
feature that drives the phenomena we are interested in (e.g. unemployment) are preference shocks 
we know close to nothing about? 
What is even more remarkable, however, is that these modifications, these preference shocks, are 
not seen by those perched on the DSGE branch as a possible indictment of this research field. On the 
contrary, they appear to be seen as new research avenues that add to the power of these models to 
explain better or more of our economic environment. This is a disturbing development, because it 
indicates that their perspective on what is happening in this research field is drastically different 
from that of others sitting on other branches, and sharing, presumably, the same trunk of this tree. 
But does this common field, this trunk that unites us still be something we can all appeal to? Can we 
as a discipline find epistemic criteria that would allow us to not only discard twigs but also develop 
different branches of economic knowledge? Professor Leijonhufvud’s paper is arguing in favour of 
such a systemic change and offers pointers on how to proceed. My fear is that we may be reaching a 
point of no return, a complete collapse of common ground for solving scientific disagreements 
between the different proponents in this field of knowledge. This collapse means that we cannot, as 
a discipline, discuss the merit of whole branches of research, and even agree to discard one branch 
and start investigating others. In fact, the very concept of the discipline as a tree with branches then 
comes into question. And then Professor Leijonhufvud’s ‘wonderland’, may continue to create 
dystopian realities for some time to come.  
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 And Professor Leijonhufvud makes a number of observations of how DSGE models fare in this regard. 
